



# CFP: Thought Experiments in the History of Philosophy of Science

Special Issue of *HOPOS*

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Thought experiments play important epistemological roles in scientific practice. But philosophical debate on how they work has reached something of a stalemate: there are empiricist, rationalist, naturalist, Kantian, phenomenological, pluralist, contextualist, and skeptical accounts on offer, with no consensus in sight. A fresh investigation into the historical trajectory of the discussion could break the stalemate, and be of independent historical interest. Motivating questions include: Are there lesser known writings on scientific thought experiments (e.g., by pragmatists and feminists) that deserve more attention? Were Popper's epistemological concerns about thought experiments the same as those we discuss today? Why, despite their use of thought experiments and interest in the methodology of science, were the positivists relatively silent on the topic? What did Lakatos intend when he likened mathematical proof to thought experiment? To what extent was Duhem really a skeptic about scientific thought experiments? And how can we relate the views of neo-Kantian positivists to those of past and future neo-Kantians? This issue of *HOPOS* calls for a return to our history in order to advance our present understanding of scientific thought experiments.

Deadline: March 19, 2019

Word limit: 7000 words

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